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Discussion After the Speeches of Joseph P. Griffin and
Lawson A. W. Hunter
QUESTION, Professor King: I think one of the problems in the
administration of the U.S. antitrust laws has been changing versions of
the application of international antitrust rules: there are the 1977
guidelines and 1988 guidelines. What I am concerned with is whether
there is any remedy for this problem, which affects our relations with
other countries, or whether it is always going to be in flux. When one
administration says one thing, and another administration says another,
what is the solution?
ANSWER, Mr. Griffin: You are absolutely right, Henry. In fact,
it is worse than you described. Look at the substantive side, for example, either in the context of intellectual property or not, vertical restraints have literally come full circle now.
One of Anne Bingaman's last speeches reads very much like it was
written in the late '70's, and forgets the last 15 years of complete
change in analysis. Part of it is the fashion of economics and the political realism of the day. But I think that is going to continue and that is
one of the reasons I continue to be pessimistic, because antitrust is not
a fixed concept. It is not like saying it is wrong to kill people unless you
have one of a few justifications. You cannot get fundamental agreement among four or five countries, let alone 200, on most of the list of
what, at least the United States considers to be anti-competitive
activities.
In many parts of the world, not only is it not anti-competitive, but
it is well accepted doctrine that you do it that way or another way. So
yes, the problem of the changing fashion of economics is impacting us.
There are the changing political realities in the United States of who is
in power, and as our chairman was pointing out, one of the current
political ideas is to use antitrust as a trade policy weapon. What we
cannot achieve by negotiation, like opening markets, let us achieve by
antitrust attack. And that is the current fashion in the Clinton Administration. We have failed in GATT; we have failed in several other negotiations, and we will now turn to the antitrust weapon, to open that
up. So I do not see any cure for that in the short run at all.
QUESTION, Mr. Doh: My question goes back to the theme of
this conference and several conferences that Henry has sponsored in
the past, and that is this whole issue of the relationship between competition policy and dumping. Maybe if I phrase my question a little more
specifically, we can get somewhere here.
Canadian industry interests, and a couple of sectors in particular,
have long called for the replacement of anti-dumping duties with some
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form of competition policy. Most recently the steel sector seems to
think that because of the unique integrated nature of that industry,
anti-dumping duties simply do not make sense and they propose instead
to replace those measures somehow with the competition policy. I have
yet to hear anyone describe practically, in a very mechanical way how
that might work. I am wondering if our two speakers here today might
give it a quick try.
ANSWER, Mr. Hunter: I guess I am not sure what you mean by
"practically." Why could one not just eliminate the anti-dumping laws
between Canada and the United States and then you would rely on
predatory pricing laws or price discrimination laws or whatever, and we
would let the chips fall where they may? The difficulty in trying to
analyze this, and in fact I did some work for the Canadian government
at the time of their free trade negotiations on this issue, is that one
cannot quantify, or decide who would win or lose, if you abandoned the
anti-dumping laws. But I do not know what you mean by "practically."
QUESTION, Mr. Doh: I mean the jurisdictional issues that you
have already discussed in terms of whose law would be employed and
under what circumstances. If the corporation in question were not
transnational, would any of the problems that we cited here this morning about how you effectively harmonize the law not decide how the
law is implemented? Would you run up against them if you pursued
that?
ANSWER, Mr. Hunter: I am not so sure if you accept my very
first thesis, which is that the Effects Doctrine now can be applied in
each country, and that it will not be that difficult a problem. In the
past, Canada would have been the most concerned, because we did not
assert jurisdiction in an aggressive, extra-territorial manner and I still
do not think we do so, certainly not anywhere near as aggressively as
the United States does. But, I think the Canadian government probably
is willing to take their chances, if they could get rid of the dumping
laws.
I guess the analogy that I always used to make about it is that in
essence what the dumping laws do is to say that, in a domestic environment, it would be illegal for someone in California to decide to enter
the New York market by lowering their price for an initial period of
time in order to gain minimum critical mass in that market, thereby
having the effect of lowering the output or the profits or their prices in
the New York market. That is clearly not illegal in the United States,
and in a free trade zone, why should it be illegal between Canada and
the United States?
COMMENT, Mr. Doh: I am not quibbling with the critique, I am
just having a hard time grappling with the remedies.
ANSWER, Mr. Hunter: But the only difficulty with the remedy is
whether each country feels it will be able to control the practices of the
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other companies in their market. And if they come to the conclusion
that they can, then, in my view, I think they can. I do not think it is
really a serious problem there, partly because it does not happen very
often.
ANSWER, Mr. Griffin: I think I generally agree with most of
what Lawson said; let me try a slightly different tilt on it.
I do not think there is a real jurisdictional issue here, because on
both the Canadian and U.S. side, as to what otherwise would be predatory pricing, you would say you are talking about imports into their
country. So you are not really talking about effects and extra-territorial
jurisdiction. Instead, you are talking about Canadians selling into the
United States, and Americans selling into Canada. So I do not think
you really would get much into issues of extra-territoriality.
I think the real problem is that it is entirely possible that conduct
that would constitute dumping under various definitions and various international treatises would not be an antitrust violation. That is, there
is a zone of conduct, that Lawson was talking about, where the antitrust violation is roughly equivalent to predatory pricing. But predatory
pricing requires, if you will, evil intent and in fact, has certain technical definitions about average cost of production. So it is entirely possible to have prices and conduct which are not predatory, under American definitions, but which do constitute dumping, under various
international definitions.
Thus, if you removed the dumping remedy, you would have no
antitrust remedy. And that is one of the reasons that people want to
keep both in place, because the theory is that you have added
protection.
COMMENT, Mr. Hunter: It is, however, irrational protection, because it makes no economic sense.
QUESTION, Mr. Brand: Joe Griffin, in his introduction, mentioned that in the ITO Charter there were competition law rules that
simply did not come into existence. When you combine that with the
discussion of both speakers that WTO was going into competition law
rules, it seems to me that the conclusion is that it is impractical at this
point. But as a theoretical concept, it seems that if we are going to have
trade rules to keep governments out of restricting trade, and the European Community realized from the start that you could not have those
rules work unless you combined them with competition law rules that
prevent the same kind of restriction by private parties, then even
though you think it is impractical, at this point, to go that distance, is
it not theoretically appropriate to look in that direction?
My second question is, is the impracticability in part, not so much
related to the theoretical basis for the antitrust laws, but the feeling on
the part of other countries towards the enforcement mechanisms that
have accompanied antitrust laws in the United States?
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ANSWER, Mr. Griffin: Very much the latter and not the former.
That is, if you go back and read the ITO Charter or you go back and
read the 1980 U.N. Model Rules, and there is now a group of academics who propose something for WTO, there is not a problem that reasonable people cannot agree on a set of rules. That is not the problem
at all. Many groups of reasonable people over the last 50 years have
been able to come up with drafts that were perfectly sensible. Some of
them might be out of fashion now because of changing economic theories, but they made sense.
The real problem has been, back to Henry's topic, sovereignty.
The ITO Charter was vetoed by the United States, not because it did
not make economic sense or not because they could not understand
what the concepts were. The United States was faced with a choice of
do we let some sort of multi-national enforcement mechanism tell us in
part how to run our economy, or do we preserve that for ourselves. And
that was, as they say, a no-brainer in the Congress. They could not
muster anything like a close vote, because the American Government
was not willing to give up its prerogative to organize and run its
economy.
If I have not been clear, let me try one other way. I do not think it
is much of a problem at all with coming up at least with what I would
call a minimum antitrust code. I think you could get a dozen people in
a room and get it done in a weekend. There are plenty of models out
there. You might quibble about whether we want to include criminal or
civil, or whether we want to include vertical price fixing or not, but you
could come up with a minimal list that would have virtually universal
agreement very quickly.
The problem is when you come to say "How will we enforce it?
Private actions, treble damages, criminal actions, government actions?
Are we going to let someone else, other than our own elected officials,
tell us in effect, to break up state monopolies, to deregulate, to do a
different kind of pricing than we do here now?" That is where it fails,
and that has been the most contentious side of the European Union's
approach to this. And Maggie Thatcher's big point about subsidiarity
and federalism has been exactly what was mentioned this morning.
Unelected officials are deciding those issues, rather than the voting
public in Europe. And that is arguably the biggest complaint against
that system, not that you cannot devise the rules.
ANSWER, Mr. Hunter: I just want to add a little bit to that. The
difficulty I have with that, Joe, is that the international trade rules
clearly impose restraints on the United States, as well as everyone else,
and why is this area of the law, antitrust law, so different that Congressmen or whoever have to decide?
I think what has happened is that we have seen the Americanization of antitrust law in the last 40 years and certainly in the last dec-

Griffin and Hunter-DISCUSSION

ade. Now most of the new laws that are passed - maybe because they
are civilian, maybe because they are in Europe -- have adopted the
EEC model, but by and large conceptually these laws are the same.
It would seem to me that if the law is conceptually the same; if
one can see a predictability of results in the way behavior or transactions are analyzed by other antitrust authorities, then the American
government should not be too concerned about ceding the possibility
that someone else is going to rule on them because the result would be
the same as would have happened if they would analyze it here.
ANSWER, Mr. Griffin: I can agree about the American politicians being the problem, but let me give you the most recent example,
because I happen to be involved in it.
If you go back the European Union/American Antitrust Cooperation Agreement to which Lawson referred, it began with the proposal
by Leon Britton for a binding treaty. What he did, if you go back and
read the first speech, was to propose a binding treaty because he could
see the conflict coming in the merger regulation, where Europeans
might well prohibit a merger the Americans would permit and vice
versa. He said, "I can see that problem coming; we have got to solve it.
My proposal is that we do a binding treaty to prevent that kind of
thing from happening, with a binding dispute resolution mechanism."
The Americans said, "absolutely not. The only thing we will talk to you
about is notification, consultation and so forth." So as recently as then,
that has been the position of the American government when confronted with the opportunity of the other side saying we are willing to
be bound; we are willing to go forward with some sort of international
mechanism. Americans have said "no thanks." I am not here to defend
that.
QUESTION, Mr. Thomas: Is part of the problem right now the
imbalance in the remedies which were available? Would your position
change, if for example, a United States corporation were to impose
treble damages as a remedy? I think that there is a reciprocity element
here which is still missing, and that is that the United States attitude
on this issue would probably change if the U.S. private sector was exposed to the kind of remedy that foreigners are only exposed to in the
United States right now.
I think you will see a change, just as it is in the trade remedy area,
where United States exports are now facing anti-dumping remedies in
places like Korea and countervailing duty cases in places like Brazil.
The United States is beginning to encounter procedural protection and
the problems that others have complained of in the United States. So,
would that make any difference if you started to see more rigorous
remedies in other places?
ANSWER, Mr. Griffin: Well, I certainly think so, but understand
that this is a double edged sword. Remember that American business
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has been ambivalent about that issue, in part because of what the other
side of it is. American companies have said 90 % of the way they protect themselves is that their lawyers bring cases against competitors
who do wrong. They do not rely on our government. Our government
only does 10% of the work and then they do it badly and it changes
with administrations.
Most American companies will tell you "Yes, if I have got a serious problem, I want to protect myself. It is very important for me to
know that I might ask my government first, but for me to know and be
able to protect myself if they will not do it." So they turn around and
say, "If I had the equivalent protection abroad, where not only could
they sue me privately but I could sue them privately, I would be much
more interested in that kind of regime."

